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ARGUMENT OF NEW MATTERS RAISED BY OLD STANDARD 
I. 3D NEVER ADMITTED THE "VALIDITY" OF OLD 
STANDARDS' CLAIM IN THE BANKRUPTCY SCHEDULES 
In its Respondent's Brief, Old Standard presents its own Statement of Facts in 
which it makes this allegation: "Under oath. 3D listed the loan as a valid, uncontingent, 
undisputed and liquidated obligation of S6,500,000." Brief of Respondent, Statement of 
Facts, No. 10. 
This is untrue. The permanent icilidity of the claim was neither admitted nor 
addressed in the schedules. In its bankruptcy schedules, 3D: 
a. Listed OLD STANDARD'S claim on "Schedule A - Real Property" by 
typing "36,500.000.00" under the column labeled "Amount of Secured Claim." 
This is neither misleading nor inconsistent with OLD STANDARD'S claim in this 
present state court action. (Exhibit "C" to Appellant Appendix, p. 47.) 
b. Listed OLD STANDARDS claim on "Schedule D - Creditors Holding 
Secured Claims" by typing "$6,500,000.00" under the column labeled "Amount of 
Claim without Deducting Secured Claim." This is neither misleading nor 
inconsistent with OLD STANDARD'S claim in this present state court action. 
vExhibit "C" to Appellant Appendix, p. 58.) 
c. Did not mark the columns labeled "contingent", "unliquidated" and 
"disputed" on "Schedule D - Creditors Holding Secured Claims". This defined 
the status of OLD STANDARDS claim in the bankruptcy. This is neither 
1 
tuMi-ading no r inconsistent with 3D5s right to defend itself against a foreclosure 
deficiency in a state court act ion. 
3D did not nTcvoeaui) . n n - ' *: - - •'•• > — ! - •!'.:•:•. .>: die debt . 3D simply 
c h o - r i u . i •• oinest the debt in the bankruptcy . 
II. OLD STANDARD IS REALLY ARGUIN G WAIVER - I HA i 
SOMEONE WHO FAILS TO DISPUTE A CLAIM IN A FAILED 
BANKRUPTCY HAS FOREVER WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO 
DEFEND ITSELF IN ANY OTHER FORUM. 
OLD STANDARD carefulh" crafts a waiver argument in terms of honest}- -
judicial estoppel. However, the conclusion of its argument is m.u a ocou ^ \ • ..m- o 
dispute a debt m a lam-u •;.• ... _ "\ ha fnrover waived any right to defend itself 
on the d e b t in any other forum. This is an extreme position. 
In Utah, "a waiver is the intentional relinquishment ul a known r:„nt". An lericai 1 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquisi. . . • iu: 1>I 1M\^ i i . ' l - J - ! ! ! (^<' ;•:••! in ^  Phoenix 
in>. \. Hi am. •! '! Dl. 61 P.2d 308. 311 (1936)); see also Plateau Mining Co. v. State 
ex rel. Utah Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990). The action or conduct 
of a party waiving a right must unequix ocalU show ,n inii ni i n n 'wuninhi ,it least be 
in*••-•n.M.M'\!v «••••1 '• • y Kee^ v. In tc rmounta in Hea l th Ca re . Inc. , 808 P2d 
1069, 1074 (Utah 1991). 
T h e bankruptcy schedules do n- .. i . I . ^ . H . I L . . :• - - • ..- ca l l 
defenses h> a >ia;i «'/•:'• ''''V: insure action. 
2 
OLD STANDARD is reading column labels on the bankruptcy "Schedule D -
Creditors Holding Secured Claims" this way: 
"If you do not mark this column, you intentionally and irrevocably waive, forever, 
any right you may have to assert any claim in your defense in any other forum at any 
time." 
This extreme reading of the bankruptcy schedules is unwarranted and ignores the 
economic realities of a bankruptcy filing. In a chapter 7 bankruptcy, a petitioner seeking 
a full discharge has nothing to gain by disputing the amount of a claim or in litigating a 
portion of a claim. If successful, the debtor will be discharged on the debt whether it's 
disputed or not, whatever its amount, and without regard to its validity. It would establish 
poor public policy to require all disputes to be either raised and litigated in the bankruptcy 
or be forever lost. Such a rule would require bankruptcy petitioners to further exhaust 
their financial resources by drawing every claim into question and then litigating them all. 
III. THE FOUR BANKRUPTCY CASES CITED BY OLD STANDARD 
DO NOT SUPPORT ITS ARGUMENT THAT BANKRUPTCY 
SCHEDULES CREATE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURT. 
OLD STANDARD cites four bankruptcy cases for its argument that, "Debtors 
who fail to list offsets or counterclaims are barred by judicial estoppel from asserting such 
claims once the bankruptcy is over." Respondents Brief, p. 9. Being "over", by OLD 
STANDARD'S definition includes voluntary dismissal. The four cases, however, were 
prosecuted to a final conclusion. 
3 
In fact, the courts which have examined the issue of whether a party is bound by 
the amount of a claim shown in its bankruptcy schedules have held that a party is not 
bound by the amount shown on the bankruptcy schedules. For instance, in In re Cobb. 6 
B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1985), the court stated: 
[TJhis court is inclined to give little weight to values ascribed to assets in 
bankruptcy schedules. The schedules are often prepared in haste without 
much thought being given to the values reflected therein and the possible 
consequences of such statements of value. . . Their prior statement of value 
in the schedules is nothing more than an admission by a party opponent. 
The admission is not conclusive. It is merely an exception to the hearsay 
rule which can be overcome by competent evidence offered by the debtor. 
Id. at 442. (emphasis added) 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Horner v. 
Hammer. 249 F. 134 '4th Cir. 1918): 
Filing the schedule in a proceeding in bankruptcy is an ex parte act on the 
part of the bankrupt, and in that proceeding is a solemn admission which, 
unless corrected, binds him. It i s , in no proper sense , res judicata, 
either as to creditors or the bankrupt. Certainly, in another and 
independent proceeding, it has no force against the bankrupt 
than evidence of the truth of the statement. 
His action [in scheduling a debt], while entirely proper, for the purpose of 
giving to rhe court, its officers and his other creditors notice of the debts 
which he owed, entitled to share in the distribution of his assets, is not, in 
any sense res judicata; it is not the judgment of the court. 
I d at 137. (emphasis added) 
This is also the position of one of the leading treatises on bankruptcy law, Collier 
on Bankruptcy, which states: "[I]n an independent proceeding, a debtor's filed 
4 
s c h e d u l e h a s n o o t h e r f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e d e b t o r o t h e r t h a n a s a n a d m i s s i o n 
4 Collier on Bankruptcy 521.08[2] [a]. 
IV. O L D S T A N D A R D C O N F U S E S RES J U D I C A T A A N D 
COLLATERAL E S T O P P E L . 
In its Response Brief, pages 16 through 20. O L D S T A N D A R D cites to and quotes 
from Utah cases for its conclusion that a default judgment is us judicata as to the matters 
decided. In doing so, it confuses Utah definitions. "Res judicata" applies only to issues 
decided in the same case - claim preclusion. "Collateral estoppel" - issue preclusion - is 
the appropriate analysis in this appeal. 
Much confusion has resulted from the use of the t erm "res 
judicata" to refer to either claim preclusion alone or to the overall 
doctrine, incorporating both claim and issue preclusion. To avoid 
engendering further confusion, we will use "res judicata" to refer to 
the overall doctrine of the preclusive effects to be given prior 
judgments . We wil l use the term "claim preclusion" to refer to the 
branch which has often been referred to as "res judicata" or "merger 
and bar." And we use the term "issue preclusion" to refer to the 
branch often t ermed "collateral estoppel ." See the discussions in Penrod v. 
Xu Creation Creme. Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 Utah 1983,, Mel Trimble Real 
Estate \ . Monte Vista Ranch. Inc., 758 P.2d 451. 86 Utah Ad\. Rep. 29. 30 .Utah 
App 1988). and Lane \ Honeywell. Inc.. 663 F. Supp. 370.371 n. l . 372 & n.2 
(D. Utah 1987). See generally F.James & G. Hazard. Civil Procedure § 11.3 (3d 
ed. 1985); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction §4402(198ly . 
Noble v. Noble. 761 P2d 1369, 1375 n. 5 (Utah 1988) emphasis added 
One major distinction between the two doctrines is their treatment of a default 
judgment , the "fully litigated" requirement. 
"But it is important to keep in mind this distinction between 
the rule of res judicata and that of collateral estoppel: while as 
5 
indicated above, the former applies both as to i ssues which were 
actually tried and those which could have been tried in a prior action, 
the latter does not apply to i s sues that merely "could have been tried" 
in the prior case , but operates only to i s sues which were actually 
asserted and tried in that case ." 
International Resources v. Dunfield . 599 P2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979)(emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's summary judgment should be reversed and the case should be 
remanded fro further proceedings. 
D A T E D this \(o day of February. 2005. 
Keith M. Backman. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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